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A B S T R A C T
This study is motivated by the ongoing debate on resource rent taxation in Norwegian fisheries. Drawing on
strategy literature, this paper argues that resource rent is just one of several conceivable sources of above-normal
profit (superprofit) for a firm in a natural resource-based industry. The financial statements of almost the whole
population of the Norwegian purse seine fleet were analyzed (61 firms owning 65 vessels) for a 5-year period and
the level of superprofit for each company was calculated. The findings show that the average firm made modest
superprofit in 4 out of 5 years. One reason is that the firms have received a large portion of their quota portfolios
gratis. Another reason is that the competition arena is favorably protected through institutionalized barriers to
entry. Moreover, the study reveals large profitability variations among seemingly similar firms. Different sources
of superprofit were therefore investigated. It was found that the most profitable firms were the most risk adverse.
They invested in neither large quota shares nor large catch capacities; as a result, their balance sheets were not
debt loaded. The paper concludes by discussing policy implications and limitations of the findings.
1. Introduction
It is not surprising that resource economists have devoted con-
siderable research efforts to investigate different issues related to re-
source rent generation (e.g., Refs. [1–13]. Several of the above-
mentioned studies are rooted in traditional industrial organization
theory. A general key assumption within this perspective is that man-
agement can neither affect a firm's performance nor conditions within
the industry [14,15]. Another assumption is that resources are expected
to be mobile and homogeneously distributed, i.e. firms have the same
resource mix and as a consequence follow the same strategies [16].
Resource rent, therefore, is the only source left to explain the above-
normal profit earned by average firms of natural resource-based in-
dustries (NRBIs).
Furthermore, industry has been used as the unit of analysis in most
of the abovementioned studies. As an empirical consequence, average
industry data from national accounts or industry surveys are used to
estimate the level of rents. However, at industry level, average calcu-
lations may be misleading indicators of economic rents in fisheries [17].
One reason is that average numbers include all business units of the
firms in the industry, which is both catch-, process-, sales-fishery enti-
ties and non-fishery entities. In addition, even if only catch-related
activities were included, unprocessed data based on firms' financial
statements will involve returns related to not only operating activities
of fishing but also general investments and financing activities of the
firms. Accordingly, average industry data that mix diverse business
entities and various business activities will provide inaccurate estimates
of profits stemming from the harvesting of a wild natural resource.
Investigating the existence of above-normal profit at the firm level,
as seen through strategic lenses, is the core of the present study. In the
literature, a plethora of terms have been attached to the idea of above-
normal profit. This paper defines rent or superprofit in line with Magni
[18] as the surplus profit that remains after the opportunity cost of
capital has been charged. That is, rent or superprofit is used as syno-
nyms for the business economics term “residual income” (RI). Super-
profit may stem from diverse sources. For example, firms may be ex-
traordinary efficient (e.g. Ref. [16] or they may have gained a favorable
strategic position within the industry (e.g., Ref. [19]. Finally, the paper
argues that resource rent in combination with regulatory rent may be a
third source contributing to above-normal profit [20,21] for natural
resource-based firms. However, the terms resource rent and regulatory
rent are discussed as an integral part of the theoretical perspective
applied (Fig. 1).
To test the theoretical framework empirically, hypotheses were
developed and the financial statements of almost the entire population
of Norwegian pelagic fishing vessels firms (65 units) were reviewed and
analyzed. The findings of the study support arguments in the literature
that both industry effects (e.g. Ref. [22] and firm-level effects (e.g. Ref.
[23] significantly affect a firm's performance. The profit of most firms
was above normal most of the time. In 4 out of 5 years, the average firm
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made superprofit. Furthermore, the findings show that the firms that
had acquired the largest quota shares did not achieve highest return on
invested capital. However, they had incurred the largest relative debt
burden. The firms that based their entire operation on quotas received
for free turned out to be most profitable.
In the following sections, strategy literature that focuses on diverse
sources that may lead to above-normal firm profit is presented. Next,
the context of the study, empirical hypotheses, method used and results
obtained are presented. Finally, findings, implications, and limitations
are discussed before suggesting some possible directions for future re-
search.
2. Theory
In the strategy literature, there is an ongoing debate on why some
firms are able to generate above-normal profit, i.e., superprofit.
According to the dominant perspectives, sources of a firm's superprofit
can be found in the firm itself (e.g., Ref. [16], or in the industry (e.g.,
Ref. [19], which may provide the firm's access to natural resources,
which form the basis of its existence (e.g., Ref. [21]. This section dis-
cusses the manner in which superprofit concept is treated in each of the
two main perspectives. Subsequently, it makes an attempt to integrate
them to obtain a more holistic view of conceivable sources of super-
profit for a firm.
Porter's works (e.g. Refs. [19,24–27] have significantly influenced
strategic literature in recent decades by taking an industry view of
superprofit generation. Porter claims that an overriding strategic goal of
a firm is to uncover and select an attractive industry, thus enabling it to
earn industry rents. This paper argues that industry rents may arise
from different but related sources in an NRBI. First, a firm may gain
access to free or cheap natural resources, enabling it to earn industry
rents. This is the resource rent part of industry rents. Resource rent
denotes the extra return that can be expected by allowing firms to use
scarce and valuable common natural resources as input without having
to pay for it [20,21]. For firms participating in wild fisheries, these
rents represent the value of the input, which is biologically generated
by the stock of fish (e.g., Refs. [3,7]. Fishing licenses received gratis by
the state or purchased at a price below the market value can provide a
good foundation for generating resource-type of industry rents and
subsequently superprofit for a business.
Next, the firms in the industry may make additional rents resulting
from being part of a competition arena that is favorably protected
through institutional arrangements implemented through government
policy, i.e., regulatory rent. Public policy and regulations can affect the
overall attractiveness of an industry and the competitive forces and
dynamics within it. Although Porter's five-force model did not explicitly
acknowledge the role of government, he and others did note the manner
in which government could influence a number of the forces, for ex-
ample, by creating higher barriers to entry through regulations or other
means [27]. Firms, being part of an NRBI, may be highly protected
through institutional arrangements. Intentionally, these may have been
designed to protect the stocks of fish and to create a profitable en-
vironment for the players (e.g., Ref. [13]. Thus, any firm that is fa-
vorably protected through institutional arrangements in a NRBI has a
potential to earn regulatory-type of industry rent and hence superprofit.
After having selected an attractive industry, Porter argues that the
next strategic move of a firm is to find a favorable position within the
industry either as a cost leader or by differentiating its products. If
succeeding, a firm has the potential to earn monopoly-type of rent, or
positioning rents. Porter [19] claims that five forces can threaten a firm's
prospects to develop an advantageous strategic position within an in-
dustry. The industry threats may arise from new entrants, harsh rivalry,
access to substitutes, powerful suppliers, and powerful buyers.
Finally, superprofit may be a result of superior internal efficiency.
This argument is in line with the resource-based view of strategy (RBV)
that examines potential sources of economic rents internally in the firm
(e.g., Refs. [16,28–31]. Thus, efficiency is primarily driven by resources
and capabilities, which are built within the boundaries of the firm.
Resources are defined as tangible or intangible assets that are semi-
permanently linked to a firm [32]. It may be intangible fishing rights,
brand names, technology knowledge, personnel skills, trade agree-
ments, working procedures, institutionalized practices, and so on [31].
Resources are assets that are owned or controlled by the firm, whereas
capabilities are described as socially complex procedures that de-
termine how efficient a firm is able to transform inputs into outputs
[33]. Properties of the accumulation process can make resources and
capabilities valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable, and thus
hard to acquire for competitors [16]. This is in contrast to resources
that are bought in strategic factor markets [34,35]. Hence, RBV claims
that the basis for competitive advantages and superior performance is
grounded in resources and capabilities that are heterogeneously dis-
tributed between firms and are immobile and hard to imitate. Accord-
ingly, above-normal profit generation is a result of a firm being able to
economically exploit strategic resource portfolios that it owns or con-
trols. A firm that is able to use its internal strengths economically has a
potential to earn efficiency rents.
To sum up, the literature review reveals that there may be several
sources of superprofit for a firm, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Having free
[21] and protected access to scarce and valuable natural resources may
give rise to industry rents, which are composed of resource rents and
regulatory rents. Another source is based on the firm's ability to stra-
tegically position itself favorable within the industry, i.e., strategizing
[19]. A final source is internal and stemming from superior internal
efficiency, i.e., economizing [16]. For a firm to perform above normal,
there must be a good fit between internal capabilities and the strategy
being followed [31]. However, there must also be a good fit between
firm strategy and the industry environment as changes in the industry
may change the significance of resources to the firm [36]. Thus, the
different sources of superprofit are intertwined and mutually dependent
of each other, and methodologically it is challenging to separate one
type of rent from the other.
In the next section, the empirical context of the study is described.
3. Empirical context
Pelagic fishing has a long tradition in Norway. Export of herring can
be traced back to the 13th century. As a result of the collapse of the
herring stock in 1968–1969, a halt on registration of purse seiners was
introduced, and vessels of 90 feet and above registered in 1973 received
their fishing licenses for free [37]. The main aim of the licensing system
was to avoid biological overexploitation of the stock (biologic
Fig. 1. Tentative theoretical framework.
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sustainability), ensure a profitable harvesting industry (economic sus-
tainability), and maintain a reasonable regional distribution of the va-
lues created by the fleet (social sustainability) [2]. As of today, the
stock is rebuilt, and herring is managed within safe biological frame-
works.
Pelagic fishing takes place during hectic and partly overlapping
seasons, followed by long periods of inactivity. In 2011 (the year before
this study begun), the population of Norwegian purse seiners consisted
of 80 vessels. The average vessel was then 18 years old and 63 meters
long, with an engine power of approximately 4700 HK. Mackerel and
Norwegian spring-spawning herring were the two main species and
accounted for approximately 73% of the revenues. The profitability of
the industry has been good the last decade or so [38].
The number of purse seiners in Norway has been relatively stable
the past 10 years. Southern Norway has the largest geographic con-
centration of firms, and Hordaland county controlled 41% of the rights
in 2011. The ownership of purse seiners is fragmented. As a rule, there
are different families who own a vessel each. In 2011, 50% of the rights
were controlled by 17 major owners (ibid.). The crew of the boats is
more or less independent of the boat size and consists of about 10
members.
Formally, Norway does not manage its fisheries by individual
transferable quotas (ITQs). However, in reality, the fisheries manage-
ment system in Norway has many similarities with such a system [1,6].
In this system, a total quota (TAC) was allocated to individual vessels
based on the vessel size (IVQ) [13]. Norway implemented a new quota
transfer system in 1996. This system allows a vessel to buy another
vessel and add a certain fraction of the acquired vessel's quota to its
own vessel. The condition is that the purchased vessel is scrapped or
sold out of the fishery [6]. For example, if a purse seiner registered in
Northern Norway acquires another vessel from the same region, 95% of
the original quota carried by the acquired boat is transferred to the
buyer's boat [13]. Although the basis (original) quota is not limited in
duration, the transferred quota (also called “structural quota”) is lim-
ited to 20 years (ibid). The degree of transferability for individual
quotas has generally increased over time in Norway [11].
4. Development of hypothesis
According to the theoretical approach that forms the basis of this
study, a firm can generate superprofit by selecting a favorable industry,
and strategize and economize within the industry selected (Fig. 1). In
the present section, empirical hypotheses will be developed that can
help explain performance similarities and differences among the firms
that take part in the Norwegian pelagic catch industry.
4.1. Superprofit as a result of attractive industry attributes
Profitability varies among industries. Thus, investing in a favorable
industry is a vital strategic choice for a firm [19,27]. However, for
many of the current family-owned firms that are included in this study,
the choice of industry has hardly been a relevant issue. Instead, “the
industry has chosen the firms” as parents, grandparents, or great-
grandparents once upon a time invested in a pelagic fishing boat. This
historical decision has guided many firms' current industry affiliation
through path dependency [39]. The Norwegian pelagic industry is
characterized by a number of attractive attributes for the incumbent
firms. Historically, the firms were provided access to scarce valuable
wild fish resources for free [2]. A significant portion of their quota
portfolios has thus no footprint in their financial statements. Accord-
ingly, all firms have a potential to harvest resource rent. The industry's
specific advantage is further enhanced by the fact that the firms do not
have to pay a resource rent tax on their catch or profit.
The catch capacity in the pelagic fishing industry has been gradually
regulated through access restrictions and structural measures [3,6].
This has resulted in the total catch revenue being distributed to ever
fewer vessels [13]. The reduction in catch capacity that is taking place
is likely to improve the financial performance of the remaining firms in
the industry.
Moreover, there are institutional barriers to enter as fishing rights
and quotas are needed. Only Norwegian citizens (fishermen) can obtain
permission to own a fishing boat and participate in fisheries
(Participation Act of 1999). This effectively rules out financial institu-
tions and foreign investors from entering the industry. In an attractive
well-regulated NRBI where firms have received a substantial part of
their quotas for free, not only the best firms are expected to create
superprofit but also the average firm. Accordingly, the following two
hypotheses are posited.
H1a. The average firm in the Norwegian pelagic catch industry is able
to make superprofit.
H1b. The profit among most of the firms is above normal most of the
time.
4.2. Superprofit as a result of firms' strategizing efforts
In strategic factor markets, firms can buy and sell resources in order
to implement their strategies [34]. However, if the cost of strategy
implementation is greater than the returns obtained, a firm will not
create above-normal profit from its strategizing efforts (ibid.). If stra-
tegic factor markets are perfectly competitive, the full value of the re-
sources will be discounted when purchased and sold. Accordingly,
fishing vessel firms will only obtain normal returns from purchasing
strategic resources as, for example, quotas in a competitive marketplace
[9].
Nevertheless, in the present industry, some firms have pursued an
aggressive quota share accumulation strategy as they have invested in a
larger share of the total quota market than their more risk adverse
rivals. In an imperfect quota market, an obvious motive is that the in-
vestment is regarded as profitable in itself. If a seller has lower ex-
pectations of the future than the buyer, he or she may sell the quota
below its market value [34]. A firm that wants to exit the industry
because he/she is less efficient than the rivals may psychologically have
lowered his/her future expectations and subsequently charged a lower
price than necessary for the quota sold. If this happens, the buyer of the
quota will reap the economic benefits. The majority of boat owners in
the sample have purchased quota shares either before or during the
period of analysis. The firms in this strategic group have entered in-
tangible assets (fishing rights and quotas) in their balance sheets. Fur-
thermore, the input generated by the fish stock also has a cost in the
firm's income statements through depreciation and interest on the ad-
ditional debt.
A firm can increase its profitability by increasing revenues or re-
ducing costs. When investing in quotas, both of these aims can be
achieved. Larger catch capacity enables the firm to better exploit eco-
nomics of scale [7,9]. For a boat owner who is harvesting a natural
resource, the possibility of cost-effective fishing will only exist for short
periods [40]. In this case, it is important for the company to have
sufficient catch capacity to exploit the short time windows when they
are open. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is
posited.
H2. There is a positive relationship between quota share holdings and
firm profitability.
4.3. Superprofit as a result of firms' economizing
Efficiency rents refer to excessive profit that stem from a firm's
unique assets or capabilities. Consequently, considerable performance
variations are expected among firms as they own and control different
resource portfolios (e.g., Ref. [16]. Wild fish represents the critical
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input of the pelagic fishing industry, and fishing rights provide access to
this valuable natural resource. Quota is a threshold resource that
“qualifies” a firm to participate in the industry. Thus, fishing rights are
necessary for a firm to achieve supply parity with its competitors in the
pelagic harvesting place. All of the participants in the sample thus have
access to pelagic fishing resources.
Nevertheless, performance variations may arise from diverse
sources. Heterogeneity in cost and revenue structures [8] may, for ex-
ample, stem from economics of scale (see Hypothesis 2), economics of
scope or from differences in boat capacity (e.g., boat length and engine
power) and capacity utilization, and catch technology and skills of the
skipper and crew [17]. Accordingly, any individual firm may be earning
profits above normal because of internal efficiency gains [16,41].
Fishing rights and quotas that a firm has received for free at a
specific historical point in time, which probably will never occur again,
certainly have the potential to create above-normal profit.
Consequently, such an asset is considered as valuable, rare, inimitable,
and non-substitutable [16]. In addition, the fishing vessel's reputation
and the skills of its crew and skipper are expected to give rise to
competitive advantages and thus superior performance [42]. The same
applies to the owner's/board's capabilities in making strategic invest-
ments in quotas, boats, and fishing gear. Ten of the fishing vessel firms
in the sample have not purchased quotas, because there are no signs of
intangible assets in their balance sheets. Thus, the input generated
biologically by the fish stock has essentially a zero cost in the firm's
income statement. These firms have gained a cost advantage compared
to their peers. Accordingly, they seem to follow an economic harvesting
strategy, because they appear to be satisfied with their original quota
base. The following hypothesis is posited:
H3. Firms that economize with quotas received for free are most
profitable.
5. Data and methods
5.1. Sample and data collection
For this study, 65 financial statements for Norwegian purse seiners
were obtained. Of these, 61 boats were owned by firms that only had
one fishing boat, whereas 4 firms owned two boats. For each of the
firms, accounting figures were obtained from the Brønnøysund Register
Centre (in Norwegian: Brønnøysundregistrene, www.brreg.no) based
on industry code and company identification. A number of studies have
shown that extraordinary firm performance can in part be explained by
random events and that they may vary widely in a medium or longer
perspective [43]. To avoid a snapshot of the profitability of the sample
firms, the analysis period typically extend over 5 years. Accordingly,
financial statements were collected for the years 2012–2016. Only
those firms that had complete accounts for all 5 years were included in
the database. The database has 325 observations (65 vessels over 5
years). For each boat, additional information was also collected from
the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries' open database of licensed
fishing vessels. The following information was included: 1) year of
construction, 2) maximum vessel length, 3) engine power of vessel
(HK), 4) structure quota, 5) bases quota, 6) blue whiting quota, 7) quota
for small sand eel/Norway pout, and 8) other quotas (which, if ap-
plicable, are quotas for saithe south, haddock/cod, argentine, and
shrimps). Few boats have quotas of type 8, and for those who have,
quota for saithe dominate.
In some of the analyses, the accounting figures were characterized
by “outliers.” When outliers are removed from the calculations, there
were usually 1 to 4 firms with highly unreasonable accounting figures
that were removed. Treatment of outliers will be noted in each in-
dividual analysis. The 5 years of data included in this study are not
equal in terms of economic performance, because some analyses use
pooled data, whereas others use dummy variables for years.
5.2. Measuring of dependent variables
In this study, the dependent variables were return on invested ca-
pital (ROIC) and superprofit resulting from the catch business only,
because the validity of comparison is highest when firms are similar
[44]. The accounting data forming the basis of the analyses are com-
piled according to the normal accounting principles in Norway (see
Chapter 6 of the Norwegian Accounting Act). In traditional financial
statements, assets are grouped in relation to their liquidity and debts
are grouped in relation to their maturity. Such a format is useful for
creditors when analyzing if a firm is liquid to pay off its debts on ma-
turity. In this investor-oriented profitability measurement study, be-
cause a standard setup of the income statement and balance sheet was
not suitable for further analysis reorganized income statements and
balance sheets provided by Penman [45] were used. The overall pur-
pose was to classify assets and liabilities into one of the following two
categories: 1) operating assets and liabilities, and 2) financial assets and
liabilities. The same procedure was applied to the profit and loss ac-
counts. The major aim was to calculate the operating results of the core
activity (i.e., the catching business only), which is not affected by fi-
nancial items. Subsequently, operating profit after tax deduction was
calculated in accordance with the NOPLAT definition (Table 1).
Operating items are to be separated from financial items in the
profit and loss account. A similar congruent separation is to be made in
the balance sheet when calculating working capital. Thus, operational
working capital was allowed to comprise assets regarded necessary for
the operation, i.e., receivables (debtors), prepaid expenses, and in-
ventory. After this, financial assets comprised cash, other liquid funds,
and short-term investments. Typically, some cash is needed for trans-
action purposes, which was regarded as financial operating assets. An
amount equivalent to 3% of revenues was estimated as required cash
for ongoing transactions. The remainder cash was considered as fi-
nancial assets.
Current liabilities comprised trade payables, current liabilities due
to accrued liabilities and due taxes and fees, and any other short-term
liabilities for which interest is not payable. Deferred dividends not paid
and booked as accrued liabilities were reallocated to equity. Briefly,
debt that did not charge operating expenses with interest or similar
payments was regarded as operating debt and was included in net op-
erating working capital. The remainder was regarded as short-term
operational interest-bearing debt together with long-term interest-
bearing liabilities. Interest-bearing items were considered financial li-
abilities. Operating assets (plant, properties, and equipment [PP & E]),
intangible assets, and operating financial assets are defined as “invested
capital” (IC).
According to NOPLAT guidelines, free cash flow (FCF) and the ROIC
(ROICt=NOPLATt/ICt-1) of the firms was calculated. Present value of
the firm's FCF was the estimated fundamental value of operating net
investment. The estimated value of IC is different from the book value
of IC. The method used was triangulated with the RI method, which, as
expected, provided the same outcome. Finally, ROIC was compared
with normal profit to calculate the firm's superprofit.
5.2.1. Opportunity cost of capital (normal profit)







= EBIT (Earnings Before Taxes)
- General Taxes on operating profit (EBIT)
= NOPLAT (Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes)
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textbook weighted average cost of capital. As clarified by Miles and
Ezzell [46] and building on Miller and Modigliani [47]; the assump-
tions behind this often used formula is not normally fulfilled. Relative
to this study, the market value of equity, only book value is known. The
market value of debt and equity cannot be assumed to be stable over
time. The systematic risk for equity and debt cannot be easily estimated
from equity markets, because none of the firms in the study are traded
on open stock markets. Accordingly, a constant discount rate of 5%
during the period of analysis was used. The results have been tested for
variations in the discount rate.
5.2.2. Calculating RI and ROIC
RI and ROIC were calculated as follows:
= − ⋅
−











RI represents the excess return of the firm beyond its own risk-ad-
justed capital cost multiplied by its book capital invested at the be-
ginning of the period. All standard textbooks on valuation state that the
FCF method and RI method, when properly applied, yield exactly the
same value. Koller et al. [48] provides a mathematical demonstration of
this, and Ohlson and Juettner-Neuroth [49] show, by another method,
the conditions for the formulas to yield the same output.
6. Results
This section presents the empirical findings of the study in the same
order as the hypothesis in the theory section.
6.1. Superprofit as a result of attractive industry attributes
The following hypothesis was posited in the theory section of this
paper:
H1a. The average firm in the Norwegian pelagic catch industry is able
to make superprofit.
According to H1a, an average firm in the pelagic industry is ex-
pected to make superprofit. Table 2 shows the average ROIC and RI for
each year analyzed and also for the whole period of 2012–2016.
Table 2 discloses that an average firm in the Norwegian pelagic
catch industry made a superprofit in 4 out of 5 years using a cost of
capital of k= 5% and after normal profit tax (on average 25% in
Norway for this period, in 2019: 22%). The results for calculated su-
perprofit in access book value of already bought quotas and licenses
depend on assumptions on taxes and cost of capital. In Table 3, the
average annual residual income is summarized.
From a firm's point of view, the 5-year average value of RI becomes
zero with a tax rate of 25% and a cost of capital between 5% and 6%
(5.59% exactly). However, with tax rate set to 0%, the same break-even
cost of capital will be 7.46%. A tax rate of zero is relevant when cal-
culating the value added for society. Although taxes are a cost item for
private firms, they are a part of the distribution of total value added for
the entire society.
With discount rate of 5% and company tax rate of 25%, the average
superprofit (RI) is positive for 4 out of 5 years for the period
2012–2016. It is notable that this calculation is based on a definition of
capital where book values of all acquired licenses and quotas are in-
cluded. Average firms in the Norwegian pelagic catch industry did
make a private superprofit in 4 out of 5 years and an average public
superprofit (private plus taxes) for discount rates less than 7.5%. To
sum up, it seems reasonable to conclude that H1a is supported by the
findings reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Furthermore, H1b was developed in the theory section of the paper.
H1b. The profit among most of the firms is above normal most of the
time.
H1b expected most firms to perform financially above normal most
of the time. Fig. 2 illustrates the average ROIC of 64 firms in 2014 and
in 2016.
In the sample of 64 firms, only 36% (23 vessels) made a superprofit
in 2014, which was the worst year in the period. The corresponding
figure was 78% (50 vessels) in 2016, which was the best year.
Consequently, the results reported in Fig. 2 support H1b.
6.2. Superprofit as a result of strategizing
H2 hypothesis was posited in the theory section.
H2. There is a positive relationship between quota share holdings and
firm profitability.
Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship between the quota size and ROIC
for the 5-year period analyzed (2012–2016).
The findings in Fig. 3 reveal that there is no statistically significant
relation between the quota size and ROIC (R2=0.0003).1 Accordingly,
firms with largest quotas do not have significantly higher ROIC (in-
tangible assets included) than firms with smaller quotas. However, as
long at ROIC is larger than cost of capital, the investment in quotas is
profitable in terms of discounted wealth for investors. It therefore seems
reasonable to reject H2 and conclude that the most profitable vessel
firms have not acquired largest quota shares.
6.3. Superprofit as a result of economizing
In the theory section of the paper, the following hypothesis was
posited.
H3. Firms that economize with quotas received for free are most
profitable.
Table 4 shows the average ROIC, profit margin, and firm leverage
for the strategic group that has not invested in quotas and the group
that has invested in quotas for the period.
Table 4 shows that the ten firms that based their activity on quotas
received for free (QF) are more profitable than the firms that have also
invested in quotas (QI), because ROIC is significantly better in the first
group. The PM is almost identical in the two groups, whereas FL is
significant lowerly in the QF group than in the QI group. To summarize,
the results presented in Table 4 support H3, which claims that firms
that economize with quotas received for free are most profitable.
7. Discussion
The purpose of the study was to contribute to the theoretical and
empirical research stream regarding above normal profit generation in
NRBIs from a firm's perspective. Accordingly, this work is theoretically
grounded in business strategy literature aiming to investigate different
sources of superprofit. Financial statements of 65 Norwegian pelagic
fishing vessel firms were obtained, corrected, and analyzed. To avoid
snapshot data that may be influenced by random events [43], an ex-
tended period of analysis of 5 years was used. Methodically, the profit
resulting from each firm's catch business only was isolated [45].
The Norwegian purse seine fleet participates in a regulated limited
entry and quota-based catch industry that harvests pelagic fish stocks,
the most important species being herring, mackerel, and capelin.
Historically, the owner of the natural resource, i.e., the Norwegian
State, distributed fishing rights and quotas to all firms in the industry by
providing them exclusive access to harvest a common wild fish resource
1 One outlier vessel with ROIC larger than 100% is excluded from figures and
calculations.
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for free. Since 1996, a variant of an individual transferable quota
system has allowed a vessel to buy another vessel and add a certain
fraction of the acquired vessel's quota to its own vessel [6,11]. In this
way, fewer players have been able to accumulate ever larger quotas,
although there is a quota ceiling, which efficiently limits the firm's
growth opportunities.
According to the theoretical framework underpinning this study
(Fig. 1), superprofit for a firm may originate from diverse sources: 1)
the industry itself, 2) the firm's strategic position within the industry
chosen, and 3) the firm's capability of exploiting its resource portfolio
efficiently.
7.1. A moderate level of industry-related superprofit
In a free access unregulated fishery, the resource rent is expected to
be wasted through excessive levels of effort being applied by the firms
[20,21]. This will ultimately result in “the tragedy of the commons”
through overfishing of the stock. However, if effectively managed, most
fisheries are presumed to be able to generate substantial levels of re-
source rent [50].
The findings reveal that the average firm in the Norwegian pelagic
catch industry did make a moderate superprofit in 4 of 5 years in the
period 2012–2016 (Tables 2 and 3). The average superprofit was .57%,
which is 11.4% above the normal profit of 5%. This finding is in ac-
cordance with previous research on above-normal profitability of the
Norwegian pelagic fishing industry (e.g., Refs. [2,3,5,7]. Furthermore,
the study found that the profit was above normal most of the time for
most of the firms, because 36% of the companies made superprofit in
the worst year and 78% made above-normal profit in the best year,
which was 2016 (Fig. 2).
The findings disclose that threshold resources and threshold cap-
abilities are adequate to earn superprofit, because even average firms
were able to harvest above-normal profit. One reason is that the firms
have received a large portion of their quota portfolios for free. Another
reason is that the firms operate in an institutionally favorable protected
resource industry. Government policy has enabled incumbent firms to
earn a high level of economic profit while still strictly limiting entry.
The findings support those of Schmalensee [51] and Spanos and
Lioukas [52] who found that a firm's profitability was significantly af-
fected by the elements of an industry structure.
7.2. No superprofit made via strategic quota investments
The study did not find a positive association between quota in-
vestments and financial performance (Fig. 3). A conceivable explana-
tion is that quotas were bought above or at their full market price. This
is in accordance with Hannesson [5] who found that a significant share
of the resource rent is attributable to the seller when quota shares are
Table 2
Average return on invested capital and annual residual incomea.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
ROICt=NOPLATt/ICt-1 6.64% 5.20% 3.90% 5.29% 6.81% 5.57%
RIt=NOPLATt− kaICt-1 213,349 26,332 −145,755 41,866 273,445 81,847
a All numbers in 1000 NOK. Book value of acquired quotas and licenses are included as Intangible Assets and are part of net IC used in calculations.
Table 3
Average annual residual income as function of two tax rates and varying cost of capital.
Cost of Capital
3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0%
Tax Rate 25.0% 358,305 220,076 81,847 −56,381 −194,610 −332,839
0.0% 615,968 477,739 339,511 201,282 63,053 −75,175
Fig. 2. Firms with a ROIC after tax more or less than the opportunity cost of
capital (5%) in 2014 and 2016 (one outlier excluded both years).
Fig. 3. The relationship between the quota size (horizontal axis) and financial
performance (ROIC).
Table 4
Profitability measures of firms that have received licenses and quotas for free
(QF) and firms that have invested in quotas (QI).
QF (n= 10) QI (n=55)
Average Average
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 8.07% 5.37%
Profit Margin (PM) 27.39% 25.74%
Book value Total Debt/Book value Total Equity (FL) 0.59 1.86
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sold. A buyer, who has higher expectations of the future than the seller,
may buy a quota above its market value [34]. This will especially be the
case if the firm has already invested in overcapacity with regard to the
vessel. Subsequently, the initial investment in overcapacity can be re-
garded as sunk cost and motivate the buying firm to pull up the bidding
price on scarce quota resources to better exploit economics of scale
[10]. The mechanism described resembles the transitional gains trap
outlined by Tullock [53]. Moreover, as most of the boats in the industry
have many unused operating days in a year [38], they may wish to
acquire a wider quota portfolio to be able to reap economics of scope
(ibid.).
Structural quotas are of limited duration, and currently they are of
20 years. The authorities plan to reassign them to the remaining players
in the industry when these structural quotas expire. However, it is still
an open political question which redistribution key should be followed
if and when this happens [54]:26). To establish legitimacy about policy
decisions on the distribution of natural resources, it is common to as-
sociate a significant part of the redistribution to the players' historical
activity in the industry. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that
this principle will be adhered to in the future too. In that case, by ac-
cumulating large quota shares, a firm can be assured that it will also
control large shares in the future. Accordingly, accumulating quota
shares can be a rational long-term business strategy in a real option
perspective. For example, if the structural quotas are made eternal,
their values may increase sharply.
7.3. Substantial superprofit made by exploiting quotas received for free
Distinctive resources and capabilities are required to accomplish
superior performance relative to peers. This is dependent on a firm
having something unique that the competitors find difficult to imitate
[55]. For a fishing vessel firm, it may, for example, be easier to make
superprofit based exclusively on quotas that they have received for free
by being in the right place at the right time [34]. Table 4 reveals that
the ten firms in the sample that had no quotas entered in their books
performed significantly better than their rivals, with an ROIC that
equals 8.07% versus 5.37%. The profit margin is the same within the
two groups; however, each firm's leverage is significant different as the
aggressive quota buyers have funded a substantial part of their pur-
chases by debt (Table 4).
There may be several reasons for these ten firms to have chosen not
to participate in the quota competition and rather continued to econ-
omize using QF. One obvious explanation may be that they have not
found it profitable to buy quotas in the market place. An alternative
motive may be that they are planning a future exit from the industry,
for example, in connection with a generational change, and that their
main focus therefore is to maintain their attractive strategic position
until this eventually occurs [9].
7.4. Policy implications
In Norway, the state taxes the resource rent in some industries
through special tax arrangements. This applies, for example, to the
energy sector, such as the petroleum and the hydropower industries.
Therefore, these industries contribute extraordinarily to finance the
Norwegian welfare state. The taxes have great legitimacy because both
the hydropower and petroleum industries are allowed to harvest com-
monly owned natural resources. Fisheries have many similarities with
these industries, and it does not seem unreasonable to use the same tax
argument. However, until now, fisheries have not been subject to a
separate resource rent tax in Norway. When the resource rent is not
collected in a managed fishery, the value of it accrues to the vessel
owners and the fishermen in the form of above-normal profits and super
wages. In this sense, the resource rent that is generated is allocated to
only two stakeholders of society [17]. Likewise, resource rent is rea-
lized by the vessel owners when quotas are sold at a price far beyond
the vessel value without quotas [6].
A resource rent tax may be implemented in several ways; for ex-
ample, on catch volume or profit. However, it is important that the tax
does not cause a socio-economic loss by removing the incentives of the
actors to operate efficiently. If a future resource rent tax is calculated
from profit, the firms performing the worst will escape the tax (Fig. 2).
Moreover, this may reduce all firms' incentives to economize and op-
erate their business efficiently. For a resource rent tax to work neutral
in relation to the operation of the firms, it should probably be based on
the use of the natural resource that forms the foundation of their op-
erations, that is, on the landed quantity of pelagic fish. However, this
approach could lead to many firms paying a resource rent tax even if
they are unprofitable, especially in years of poor economy. This is
nevertheless a part of the market effect of resource rents, which con-
tributes to increased economic efficiency. Thus, more profitable firms
could grow, less efficient might leave, whereas new more innovative
actors possibly will enter. And if the industry is not sufficiently profit-
able overall, harvesting may be cut back.
7.5. Limitations and further research
When using survey data to estimate changes in rents across years,
changes in prices and costs are also to be considered. Profitability may
increase in the fishery due to an exogenous increase in prices because
of, for example, a shift in exchange rates or consumer preferences to
seafood. Cost reductions can also occur, for example, reduced fuel costs
[17]. Unsustainable rent may also be generated in the short-term
through natural fluctuations in stock abundance, which may result in
higher-than-average revenue per unit effort. Subsequently, the resultant
increase in profitability will only be a quasi-rent rather than resource
rent if the price, cost, stock, or institutional changes are only temporary
(ibid.). Few market segments demand herring and mackerel for human
consumption (Germany, Poland, Belarus, Japan, and South Korea). The
customers are primarily of the older generation and, over time, they
will be fewer. The industry is therefore vulnerable to a shift in demand.
Moreover, while the price of herring was 8 NOK in 2016 (the best
economic year in the period analyzed), it is halved by the time of
writing of this paper (summer 2018). Accordingly, the superprofit that
the players harvested in the period analyzed is not necessarily sus-
tainable. It may be quasi rents [44].
To investigate whether quota investments causes better (or worse)
firm profitability, we need information about what comes first in time;
quota investments or firm profitability. In order to gain such insight, we
need longitudinal data that include the timing of quota investments and
their size (e.g. quota volume and investment amount). Based on such
data it will also be possible to describe the price development of quotas
over time and the data will provide a good basis for calculating how
(un) profitable quota investments actually may be under a constrained
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